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It is increasingly accepted that the U.S. and the global economy will not get out of this severe
recession unless the credit crisis is resolved. In his recent testimony to Congress, Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke (February 2009) emphasized once more that the Fed’s forecast for a
recovery later in the second half of this year is conditional upon resolving the financial crisis, so
that credit flows to business and households are returned to normal levels. Fiscal policy on its own
will not be able to break the back of the recession unless this precondition is met. This Policy Note
attempts to assess the various schemes that have been put forward to alleviate the credit crisis and
recommend a solution.
The abiding principle in evaluating the various schemes is that a solution is appropriate if it
deals with the causes of the problem. From this angle, there are two basic views on the causes of
the credit crisis. In the first view, the depressed assets of the financial sector are currently under-
valued, either because of panic or because of the recession. If this view is correct, then the meas-
ures that have been adopted by policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are correct, and in time
they will work. Undervalued assets will become fairly valued, if not overvalued, when the reces-
sion is over. Therefore, the taxpayer will retrieve the money invested now and maybe with some
profit, if governments buy the distressed assets below fair market value.The alternative view is that
the assets are worthless and the banks, accordingly, insolvent. In this case, the measures taken so
far, and similar measures planned for the future, are inappropriate. The money that governmentshave already spent has been wasted—it’s gone into a black hole.
Of course, no one knows what the fair value of these assets is,
and only time will tell which view is correct. But by then it may
be too late. 
Despite the caveat of being unable to correctly value these
assets, we can still assess the various schemes. Table 1 presents
the consolidated balance sheet of the depository institutions.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, all remaining invest-
ment banks have become bank holding companies, so that such
a balance sheet is appropriate. Good assets are bonds or collat-
eral for bank loans whose prices have fallen a bit from face value
or precrisis levels but hold the promise that they will recover
once the recession is over. Bad assets are those whose prices
have fallen significantly from face value or precrisis levels but
can still be priced with some degree of certainty because there
are liquid markets upon which they trade. Finally, there are the
toxic assets that no one wants to hold in their portfolios. These
assets are hard to price, as they do not trade in liquid markets.
They are predominantly derivatives or synthetic assets, such as
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), CDOs-squared (or even
cubed), and credit default swaps. 
The liability side is presented according to the order in
which claims on assets can be made in case of bankruptcy.
Deposits are the liabilities that will be satisfied first, and govern-
ments have increased the guarantee limit in case these assets are
worthless. Preferred stock, which many governments have
acquired in exchange for the capital they have injected or the
insurance they have provided to troubled banks, are next in the
queue. Then there is the secured debt, in the sense that there is
collateral value, though it might be smaller than at issue (i.e.,
the secured debt may be less than the face value of the security
or bond). Next in line is the unsecured debt, which will be sat-
isfied according to seniority (senior, mezzanine, and junior) if
there is still some cash left from the sale of the assets. Finally,
common stock holders will get the residual cash, if any. With this
taxonomy we can group the various solutions into two models:
“business as usual” and “good bank.”
The “Business as Usual” Model
The “business as usual” solution is the one preferred by Wall
Street and the global banking community as a whole. It takes
three forms that nonetheless amount to the same thing: a
bailout by the government. In the first variation, the govern-
ment guarantees the assets or liabilities of the banks and/or
provides insurance for the bulk of the bad and toxic assets, usu-
ally after the bank takes the first 10 percent loss. Moreover, the
government helps to capitalize the banks in need, but in a way
that does not interfere with the running of the bank; this mainly
takes the form of acquiring preferred shares that have no voting
rights, although this has been muddled by the government
desire that troubled banks getting its support should increase
lending to business. The second variation is to remove the bad
and toxic assets from the banks’ consolidated balance sheet and
place them into a “bad bank” that is capitalized by public and/or
private money. When, or rather if, these assets recover, the
money that has been invested will be recovered. But even in this
second variation governments will have to add $500 billion in
capital to the ailing banks. The third variation is for a temporary
nationalization (or whatever term is politically acceptable to the
relevant taxpayers) but with a well-defined exit strategy, meaning
specified conditions under which the banks will revert to their
original shareholders or will be reprivatized. It is clear why this
solution has been dubbed “business as usual,” as despite the cri-
sis the banks would not bear the cost of their actions and would
continue to do business as usual. Their losses would be borne by
the taxpayer, as they are perceived as being “too big to fail.”
In evaluating the business-as-usual solution, we can clearly
see that it makes sense if the bad and toxic assets are underval-
ued and will in time recover. Even then, the success of this
approach depends on the price that the government or the “bad
bank” will pay for them. The lower the price, the higher the level
of protection afforded the taxpayer, but at the expense of the
banks. On the other hand, the higher the price, the lower the
level of protection afforded the taxpayer, but the higher the
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benefit to the banks. It is obvious that the banks want the gov-
ernment or the “bad bank” to buy these assets at face value or at
a small discount. The success of this solution depends on find-
ing the correct price, one that is fair to both parties. But it is
hard, if not impossible, to price the toxic assets, and therefore
difficult to implement this approach. Moreover, it is hard to
sway public opinion in favor of such a scheme. Most people
would quite rightly ask why the taxpayer should pay for a mess
that bankers created, as a result of which many people will lose
their jobs or see their incomes decline. The government
response is that this is necessary for the recovery of the econ-
omy. If the banks do not return credit to normal levels, there is
no chance that the economy will ever recover. 
But this assumes that the business-as-usual model is the
only available option—that there is no alternative. Yet it
emerges that there is a viable alternative, and this will make it
increasingly difficult to get the public opinion behind this scheme.
In addition, there is the well-known argument of “moral hazard”;
namely, that a bailout will only encourage more risk taking in the
future. The government stance that in the future there will be
stricter regulation is not convincing, because regulation only
closes past loopholes. It is not a forward-looking approach but a
backward-looking one. In any legislation there are always loop-
holes that will be exploited by clever people. But the biggest
blow to this approach comes from the sheer size of the problem.
The losses from the bad and toxic assets may be too big to bear,
even for governments. The losses from the credit crisis, world-
wide, have already swollen to $1.2 trillion; the International
Monetary Fund estimates that total losses will mount to $2.2
trillion, while Nouriel Roubini (Dr. Doom) thinks they will
exceed $3 trillion. These estimates are based on a simple rule of
thumb. U.S. mortgage debt currently stands at $10.5 trillion.
Assuming a 20 percent fall in house prices, the loss approaches
$2.1 trillion. However, by January 2009 house prices had fallen
26 percent from their peak in mid-2006. Using this percentage,
the loss rises to $2.7 trillion. According to the K-model, at the
bottom of the current recession house prices will have fallen by 45
percent, boosting the loss to $4.7 trillion. But this estimate does
not include bank losses from toxic assets (derivatives). If the toxic
assets are worthless, then the banks are insolvent, and the ulti-
mate cost may run into trillions of dollars that ultimately even
governments cannot afford. The insolvency case is supported by
the highly leveraged status of the consolidated balance sheet of
financial institutions due to toxic assets.
Barring the disaster scenario of wholly worthless toxic
assets, if the costs of $2.2–$4.7 trillion were to be met by public
money, then fiscal deficits in the United States and the United
Kingdom as a percentage of GDP will soar to double-digit figures
(warlike levels), while the public debt will nudge 100 percent of
GDP. With the business-as-usual model, the government, as
lender of last resort, runs the risk of becoming insolvent itself.
We may tend to think that public opinion memory is too short
and irresponsible governments will get away with their deci-
sions to postpone doing the inevitable or pass the burden to the
next government, but the vigilante is always the market. Unless
the U.S. and U.K. governments prepare a credible plan for cur-
tailing the budget deficits and public debt, their efforts will be
thawed in the long run by rising nominal and real long-term
interest rates, as inflation risk premiums, default risk premiums,
and foreign exchange risk premiums rise. Greece in the 1980s is
an example of a country that operated with double-digit fiscal
deficits that spurred the public debt from 30 percent of GDP to
more than 100 percent. The debt has not been cut, as successive
governments have been loath to take the consequences of rais-
ing taxes or cutting public spending for fear of not being
reelected. They may have avoided the consequences in the short
run, as Greece under then Prime Minister Costas Simitis made
an effort to curb the deficits and satisfy the criteria for conver-
gence to the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, therefore
qualifying for admittance to the European Monetary Union
(EMU). Acceptance to the EMU further postponed the
inevitable harsh measures, but it is doubtful whether in the cur-
rent environment Greece—and many other countries, includ-
ing Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Austria (although for
different reasons)—would ultimately avoid adopting the
inevitable harsh measures, which will have to be adopted when
a country is ejected from the common currency.
The “Good Bank” Model
The credit crisis seems insolvable only because there is no con-
sensus on a fair distribution of the costs of the bailout. So far,
only bank shareholders have paid for the mess, and only a few
bank CEOs have either willingly resigned or been forced to step
down. The banks’ senior managers are largely unscathed, and
they have even received bonuses, albeit (partially) curtailed, which
has aroused a public outcry. Moreover, the interests of the bond-
holders have so far been protected. The alternative to the business-as-usual model is a “good
bank.” This involves creating a new bank, phoenixlike, from the
ashes of each old bank. The good assets of the old bank now
form the assets of the new bank, and the deposits and secured
debt of the old bank form the liabilities (Table 1). The old insti-
tution’s banking license is replaced by a new one. The new bank
is capitalized by public and/or private money, and the govern-
ment guarantees the new loans of the new bank. The new bank
rehires the staff, but not the senior management, of the old bank
and is housed in the same buildings. The old bank effectively
becomes an asset management company of the bad and toxic
assets, with liabilities consisting of unsecured debt and preferred
and common stock. It requires only a handful of fund managers
and (as has been sardonically put) can be housed in the base-
ment of the bank’s old building. The preferred shares and unse-
cured debt are converted into common stock, so that both equity
holders and bondholders share the costs of this voyage to safety. 
The advantages of the “good bank” model are obvious.
First and foremost, credit flows to the economy return to nor-
mal, ensuring the success of easy monetary and fiscal policy in
engineering the recovery of the economy. Second, moral hazard
is minimized, as there is a clear message to future senior man-
agement that there will be no bailout. Third, this is just and fair
to the public at large and to the taxpayer in particular, as the
bulk of the cost falls on those responsible for the crisis. 
However, there is a major drawback that dulls the golden
sheen of this solution. If the old banks failed and the losses were
very large, then the ramifications will spread to the rest of the
economy, sinking the entire ship. One may indeed argue that, by
removing all the sound elements from the balance sheet of the
old banks, the probability of failure is enhanced. Moreover, the
greater the losses of the old banks, the greater the likelihood
that the entire economy could go down. Thus, we may be back
to square one, and policymakers may have no other option but
to bail out the system if the losses of the old banks are too big.
As they say, when your house is on fire, you don’t talk about
safety zones or fences that will prevent future fires; you have to
fight the fire now, and worry about future fires later on.
So far, the banks have been unwilling to come clean, or else
they don’t know what their real exposure is. The potential losses
from allowing the old financial system to go bankrupt may be
huge. Gross holdings of credit default swaps are unofficially
estimated at $60 trillion, although net holdings (namely, net-
ting out cross-holdings) may be half as much. But this may be
an underestimate judging from AIG, which recently announced
that its own nominal portfolio is on the order of $19 trillion
and reported the largest-ever loss ($62 billion) for a U.S. com-
pany. But even at $30 trillion, a bankruptcy might entail losses
of 30–50 percent, which amounts to $9–$15 trillion, when the
entire U.S. GDP is $14 trillion. But are financial institutions
really worried about becoming insolvent? Credit default swaps
provide market estimates for particular banks, but we are more
interested in aggregate measures.
An indirect way of addressing the insolvency issue at the
aggregate level is by decomposing risk into interest rate risk, liq-
uidity risk, and credit (or counterparty) risk. The total risk is
captured in the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate,
or LIBOR, as this reflects the true cost of money for banks. The
three-month overnight indexed swap (OIS) is a measure of the
interest rate risk, as it reflects market expectations of what the
Fed funds rate will be over the next three months. Thus, the
spread between LIBOR and OIS for corresponding maturities 
is a measure of liquidity and credit risk, as it has eliminated 
the interest rate risk. A measure of credit risk, in turn, is the
spread between secured and unsecured borrowing by the banks.
One form of secured loan is a government-backed repurchase
agreement (repo) between banks. Thus, the spread between
LIBOR and repo rates for corresponding maturities provides a
measure of credit risk. 
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Figure 1 Liquidity and Credit Risk vs. Credit Risk 
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The close correlation between the LIBOR–repo and
LIBOR–OIS spreads is shown in Figure 1. This suggests that the
banks are concerned more about credit risk than liquidity risk
and hence are worried about the insolvency of the entire finan-
cial system. So far, central banks have diagnosed the crisis as
stemming from a lack of liquidity and have flooded the system;
but this is not the cause of the problem. This highlights a fun-
damental difference between the Great Depression and the cur-
rent credit crisis. The former was due to liquidity risk, and
therefore the remedy was an increase in the supply of money.
But the current crisis is mainly due to credit risk. The wrong
diagnosis of the problem has led policymakers to apply the
wrong medicine. The nature of the current crisis as stemming
from credit risk is prima facie evidence that the losses of financial
institutions may surprise on the upside. The conclusion that
emerges from this analysis, therefore, is that the “good bank”
solution carries a risk that the entire economy may sink into a
worse depression than in the 1930s.
A “Good Bank” with a Personal Sector Shield:
A Viable Solution
We believe that the “good bank” model can be salvaged—with
one modification. The high risk that the entire ship will sink lies
in the cross-holdings of the assets and liabilities within the
financial sector. Each bank is holding as assets a large propor-
tion of the liabilities of the others. Thus, if one bank failed it
will have a cascading effect, dragging the rest down. This struc-
ture involves also the personal sector and to a much lesser
extent the corporate sector. The spillover of the losses of the finan-
cial sector to the personal sector is through the cross holdings of
assets and liabilities. It is this cross-holding structure that has
made the bailout of the financial system by governments
unavoidable, but it also holds the key to a viable solution. Thus,
to save the good-bank model, the obvious solution is to sepa-
rate the cross-holdings of the personal sector from those of the
financial sector. The government can guarantee or provide
insurance against some reasonable exposure of the personal 
sector to the bad and toxic assets of the old financial sector. By
doing so, the government will stop the bankruptcy of the old
financial sector from spilling over into the personal sector, thus
containing the damage. Moreover, the policymakers enforce 
an automatic deleveraging process that will drain the excess 
liquidity, which is at the root of the current credit crisis. The
automatic deleverage will speed enormously the process to
recovery; otherwise, the balance sheet adjustment in the old
financial sector and the personal sector will be extremely
long—more like ten years than two. 
Is this doable? The answer depends on the channels through
which the personal sector might be infected by the insolvency of
the old banks, along with the type of assets that will need to be
guaranteed and their amount. If the cost of the bailout of the
personal sector is smaller than the financial system, then it is
worth pursuing it (1) from an economic point of view, (2) from
an ethical and moral point of view, and (3) from the moral haz-
ard point of view.
Table 2 provides the crucial assets of the personal sector that
may be infected by the bankruptcy of the old financial system.
First and foremost, the assets that must be protected are those
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Table 2 Potentially Infected Assets (in millions of dollars)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Flow of Funds Accounts data issued by
the Federal Reserveheld indirectly on behalf of the personal sector through pension
funds for those working in the private sector and government
(federal, state, and local). Next in line are the assets of life insur-
ance and other insurance (property-casualty) companies.
Because of securitization, a large portion of federally-related
mortgage pools established by government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) are held indirectly by the personal sector. It is
safer to insure all these assets at source, and this will provide an
extra shield to the old banks. Money market funds, mutual
funds, and other funds are of less importance in providing
insurance. Certainly, hedge funds do not need to be insured, as
their investors are financially sophisticated and presumably
were aware of the risks they were undertaking—or at least, they
should have been. These assets amount to more than $30 tril-
lion, as Table 2 reveals. But the exposure of the personal sector
to the assets of the banks is through its exposure to credit mar-
ket instruments. This exposure is only a little more than $13
trillion, less than half the total. Within that category, it is impos-
sible to know precisely who holds what. But there is no doubt
that the personal sector has a large exposure to bad assets
because of securitization, but a smaller exposure to credit
default swaps than the banks. The largest chunk of these swaps
is held by the banks. Thus, as a working hypothesis, we can
assume that the potential loss of the personal sector will be
around 20 percent. This implies that the total loss of the personal
sector could be as high as $2.6 trillion. 
The government can assume an amount of potential losses
on the credit market instruments of the personal sector that will
be fair to both parties—say, the first 10–20 percent—with the
personal sector bearing the excess. Alternatively, the government
can let the personal sector bear the first 10 percent of the loss
and guarantee the remainder. In this case, the government cost
may be anywhere from zero to just over $1.3 trillion, which in
the worst case is equal to the amount of money that it plans to
spend on the bailout of the financial system. Such a solution is
not only more economical, but it is also ethical, morally correct,
and just, in the sense that those responsible for the mess must
also pay for it; it also minimizes the moral hazard.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we assess the various schemes that have been put
forward to resolve the credit crisis, which is a precondition for
a recovery of the U.S. and the rest of the world’s economies.
All these views can be grouped into two models: “business
as usual” and the “good bank.” The first takes different forms—
insurance or guarantee of the assets or liabilities of the financial
institutions, “bad bank,” and temporary nationalization—and
it is the one favored by banks and pursued by governments in
the United States, the U.K., and other countries. It amounts to
a bailout of the financial system with taxpayer money. Its draw-
back is that the cost may exceed by trillions the original esti-
mate of $700 billion; and despite the mounting cost, it may not
even prevent the bankruptcy of financial institutions. Moreover,
it runs the risk of making the U.S. and U.K. governments insol-
vent, and turning an already severe recession into a depression
worse than in the 1930s. It is also immoral and unjust (in the
sense of justice as fairness), and maximizes moral hazard. 
The “good bank” solution consists of creating a new
(phoenix) banking system from the ashes of the old one by
removing the healthy assets and liabilities from the balance sheet
of the old banks.It has a small cost and has the major advantage
that credit flows will be resumed and the economy will recover.
It is also fair and just and minimizes moral hazard. Its drawback
is that it lets the old banks swim or sink. But if they sink with
huge losses, these might spill over to the personal sector and the
ultimate cost may be the same as the business-as-usual model.
The downside may again be a depression.
Our own solution is for a modified “good bank” approach,
with the government either guaranteeing a large proportion of
the personal sector’s assets or assuming the first loss in case the
old banks fail. It has the same advantages as the original good-
bank model, but it makes sure that in the eventuality that the
old banks become insolvent, the economy is shielded from
falling into depression, and the ultimate recovery is ensured.
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